The Technology of Skill Formation by James Heckman et al.
The Technology of Skill Formation
Pedro Carneiro
University College London and




University of Chicago and
The American Bar Foundation
December 29, 2003
This research was supported by NICHD R01-34598-03.Abstract
This paper presents formal models of child development that capture the essence of recent ﬁndings
from the empirical literature on child development. The goal is to provide theoretical frameworks for
interpreting the evidence from a vast empirical literature, for guiding the next generation of empirical
studies and for formulating policy. We start from the premise that skill formation is a life-cycle process.
It starts in the womb and goes on throughout most of the adult life. Families and ﬁrms have a role in
this process that is at least as important as the role of schools. There are multiple skills and multiple
abilities that are important for adult success. Abilities are both inherited and created, and the traditional
debate of nature versus nurture is outdated and scientiﬁcally obsolete. The technology of skill formation
has two additional important characteristics. The ﬁrst one is that IQ and behavior are more plastic at
early ages than at later ages. Furthermore, behavior is much more malleable than IQ as individuals age.
The second is that human capital investments are complementary over time. Early investments increase
the productivity of later investments. Early investments are not productive if they are not followed up
by later investments. The returns to investing early in the life cycle are high. Remediation of inadequate
early investments is dicult and very costly.
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31 Introduction
This paper presents formal models of child development that capture the essence of recent ﬁndings from the
empirical literature on child development. The goal is to provide theoretical frameworks for interpreting
the evidence from a vast empirical literature, for guiding the next generation of empirical studies and for
formulating policy.
Recent empirical research in a variety of ﬁelds has substantially improved our understanding of how
skills and abilities are formed over the life cycle. The early human capital literature (Becker, 1964, Mincer,
1974) viewed human capital as a rival explanation for human ability and emphasized that acquired human
capital could explain many features of earnings distributions and earnings dynamics that models of innate
cognitive ability could not. This point of view underlies many recent economic models of family inﬂuence
(e.g. Aiyagari, Greenwood, Seshadri, 2002; Laitner, 1992, 1997). Later work (Ben-Porath, 1967 and
Griliches, 1977) emphasized that innate ability was an input into the production of human capital, although
it was ambiguous about its egect on human capital accumulation. More innate ability could lead to less
schooling if all schooling did was teach one what an able person could learn without formal schooling. On
the other hand, more innate ability might make learning easier and promote schooling. The signalling
literature made the latter interpretation in developing models of schooling that emphasized that higher
levels of schooling signalled higher innate ability. In one extreme form, this literature suggested that there
was no learning content in schooling.
The entire literature assumed that ability is an innate, scalar, invariant measure of cognitive skill.
Except for work by Marxist economists (see, e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 1976 and Edwards, 1976), noncognitive
traits like motivation, persistence, time preference and self control were neglected and treated as peripheral
to the skill formation and earnings determination process.
The literature in economics focuses on liquidity constraints and heritability as the principal sources
4of parental inﬂuence on child development. Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) initiated a large literature
that emphasizes the importance of credit constraints, family income and inherited ability on the schooling
and earnings of children. Important developments of this work by Laitner (1992, 1997), Benabou (2000,
2002), Aiyagari, Greenwood, Seshadri (2002) and Seshadri and Yuki (2003), emphasize the role of credit
constraints and altruism in forming the skills of children. Ability is treated as exogenously determined and
the lifecycle of the child at home is collapsed into a single period so that there is no distinction between
early and late investments in children. Becker and Tomes (1986) suggest that there may be no trade-og
between equity and eciency in government transfer policy because the return to human capital investment
is high due to the presence of credit constraints.
Recent research, summarized in Carneiro and Heckman (2003), presents a much richer picture of school-
ing, life cycle skill formation and earnings determination. It recognizes the importance of both cognitive
and noncognitive abilities in explaining schooling and socioeconomic success. These abilities are them-
selves produced by family and personal actions. Both genes and environments produce these abilities and
environments agect genetic transmission mechanisms (See Turkheimer et al., 2003). This interaction has
important theoretical and empirical implications.
The following conclusions emerge from the recent empirical literature on child development. Cognitive
ability is agected by environmental inﬂuences (including in utero experiences) and is formed relatively
early (by age 8 or so). It is hard to change IQ after this age. Noncognitive skills (motivation, self-
discipline, time preference) associated with development of the child’s prefrontal cortex can also be agected
by environmental interventions. These skills remain more malleable at later ages than cognitive skills.
Noncognitive skills are valued in the market place and also agect academic and social achievement.
Complementarity of investments and self productivity, two distinct ideas folded into one in our previous
analyses, are essential features of the skill and ability formation process.1 Skill begets skill; ability begets
1Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) develop a model in which ability determines schooling and both ability and schooling
5ability. Strong complementarity leads to a trade-og between eciency and equity in considering invest-
ments in human capital. Diminishing returns would argue in favor of equalization of investment across
persons. Complementarity and self productivity are forces toward specialization of investments made after
the early years to certain groups. Disadvantaged young adults with low levels of cognitive and noncognitive
skills have lower rates of return to schooling and job training than more advantaged young adults. Due to
complementarity, remediation for neglected investment is costly, and may be prohibitively so for the most
disadvantaged.
One contribution of our analysis is to place the child development process in a multiperiod context,
disaggregating the one period of family inﬂuence assumed in a variety of current models into multiple
periods. Complementarity and self-productivity of human capital imply an equity-eciency trade-og
for late child investments but no equity-eciency trade-og for early investments. This has important
consequences for the design and evaluation of public policies toward families. In particular, the returns to
late childhood investment and remediation for persons from disadvantaged backgrounds is low.
A second contribution of our analysis is to emphasize the secondary importance of credit constraints in
the college going years, as traditionally conceived in applied economics in explaining child schooling attain-
ment. Permanent income plays an important role, not income in adolescent years. Carneiro and Heckman
(2002, 2003) present evidence for American society that only a small fraction (at most 8%) of American
children are credit constrained in making college decisions. The important constraints facing children are
ones on their early environment-parental background and motivation and the like. The important market
failure is the inability of children to buy their parents and not the inability of families to secure loans for
a child’s education. This has major implications for the way family policy should be designed, and how to
remedy deﬁcits in low income and disadvantaged populations.
determine post school investment. While Ben-Porath (1967) emphasized the self-productivity of human capital, he assumed
human capital was homogeneous and did not develop models of heterogeneous skills and abilities.
6Controlling for cognitive ability, in American society with current meritocratic policies in place, family
income plays only a minor role in determining college enrollment decisions although much public policy
is predicated on the opposite point of view. Yet ability itself seems to be determined by early family
environments. Permanent income matters in determining schooling and ability, but “cash in advance”
credit constraints facing parents in the child’s teenage years do not. Ability has both environmental and
genetic components, and environments agect the expression of the genes. Evidence from interventions
on disadvantaged populations demonstrate that interventions can raise measured ability but their major
impact is on noncognitive abilities. These features are missing from the current literature in economics on
child development and our aim is to redress these gaps. They are also ignored in current empirical studies
of family and genetic inﬂuence. Measured ability is determined in part by environmental factors.
The paper proceeds in the following way. In the next section we present the main characteristics of the
technology of skill formation. Then we construct a simple model illustrating the use of this technology.
The last section concludes.
This draft is incomplete. In this version, we present the evidence that motivates our work and some
very simple models that capture some of the key features of the empirical literature. It is more of a
progress report than a ﬁnished paper. It sets forth our agenda and the main contours of our work. Much
r e m a i n st ob ed o n ea n dw ew e l c o m es u g g e s t i o n s .N o n e t h e l e s s ,a n yﬁnished model that is faithful to the
evidence summarized in this paper will stress that (a) parental endowments are key constraints governing
family inﬂuence in American society; (b) early child investments must be distinguished from late child
investments and that an equity-eciency trade-og exists for late investments but not for early investments
and (c) abilities are created, not solely inherited, and are multiple in variety. These insights change the
way we interpret the evidence and design public policy. Point (a) is emphasized in many papers. Point (b)
is ignored by models that consider only one period of childhood investment. Point (c) has received scant
attention in the formal literature on childhood investment.
72 The Technology of Skill Formation
In this section we emphasize some features of the human capital accumulation technology that are im-
portant. Some of them have not yet been fully incorporated in economic models. We provide some
empirical examples that illustrate the empirical importance of these features. A more complete review of
this evidence is provided by Carneiro and Heckman (2003).
Human capital accumulation and skill formation are dynamic processes. The skills acquired in one
stage of the life cycle agect both the initial conditions and the technology of learning at the next stage.
Human capital is produced over the life cycle by families, schools, and ﬁrms, although most discussions of
skill formation focus on schools as the major producer of abilities and skills, despite a substantial body
of evidence that families and ﬁrms are also major producers of abilities and skills. Skill formation starts
in the womb and takes place throughout the whole life of the individual. Over one half of lifetime human
capital is acquired through post-school investments (Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998).
A major determinant of successful schools is successful families. Schools work with what parents bring
them. They operate more egectively if parents reinforce them by encouraging and motivating children.
Job training programs, whether public or private, work with what families and schools supply them and
cannot remedy twenty years of neglect. Children from disadvantaged families may suger from a lack of
resources invested in them, or they may have parents that lack the information necessary to make adequate
investments in their children, even if resources are made available (for example, through state programs),
because of poor education or the like. It is easier to compensate for low current funds (if parents borrow
against future consumption to ﬁnance current investments in their children) than against low parental
human capital.
Abilities are both inherited and created. As summarized in Shonkog and Phillips (2000), the “long
standing debate about the importance of nature versus nurture, considered as independent inﬂuences,
8is overly simplistic and scientiﬁcally obsolete”. They write: “Scientists have shifted their focus to take
account of the fact that genetic and environmental inﬂuences work together in dynamic ways over the
course of development. At any time, both are sources of human potential and growth as well as risk and
dysfunction. Both genetically determined characteristics and those that are highly agected by experience
are open to intervention. The most important questions now concern how environments inﬂuence the
expression of genes and how genetic make-up, combined with children’s previous experiences, agects their
ongoing interactions with their environments during the early years and beyond.” Hansen, Heckman and
Mullen (2003) show that schooling agects cognitive ability. Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that parents
can invest in and manipulate their children’s discount rate, which can be broadly interpreted as another
type of ability.
A study of human capital policy grounded in economic and scientiﬁc fundamentals improves on a purely
empirical approach to policy evaluation that relies on evaluations of the programs and policies in place or
previously experienced. Although economic policy analysis should be grounded in data, it is important to
recognize that the policies that can be evaluated empirically are only a small subset of the policies that
m i g h tb et r i e d . I fw eb a s es p e c u l a t i o na b o u te c o n o m i cp o l i c i e so ne c o n o m i cf u n d a m e n t a l s ,r a t h e rt h a n
solely on estimated “treatment egects” that are only weakly related to economic fundamentals, we are
in a better position to think beyond what has been tried to propose more innovative solutions to human
capital problems.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) investigate the study of human capital policy by placing it in the context
of economic models of life cycle learning and skill accumulation rather than focusing exclusively on which
policies have “worked” in the past. This paper extends their analysis by presenting formal models of the
investment process.
Figure 1 summarizes the major ﬁnding of Carneiro and Heckman and the motivation for this paper.
It plots the rate of return to human capital at digerent stages of the life cycle for a person of given
9abilities. The horizontal axis represents age, which is a surrogate for the agent’s position in the life cycle.
The vertical axis represents the rate of return to investment assuming the same amount of investment is
made at each age. Ceteris paribus the rate of return to a dollar of investment made while a person is
young is higher than the rate of return to the same dollar made at a later age. Early investments are
harvested over a longer horizon than those made later in the life cycle (Becker, 1964). In addition, because
early investments raise the productivity (lower the costs) of later investments, human capital is synergistic.
Learning begets learning; skills (both cognitive and noncognitive) acquired early on facilitate later learning.
Early deﬁcits make later remediation dicult. Finally, young children’s cognition and behavior are more
easily malleable than cognition and behavior in adults: even in the absence of dynamic complementarity,
early investments are more productive than late investments. For an externally speciﬁed opportunity cost
of funds r (represented by the horizontal line with intercept r in ﬁgure 1), an optimal investment strategy
is to invest less in the old and more in the young. At any age, investment is more proﬁtable for persons
with higher innate ability. Figure 2 presents the optimal investment quantity counterpart of ﬁgure 1.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) develop an alternative interpretation of ﬁgure 1 as an empirical descrip-
tion of the economic returns to investment at current levels of spending in the American economy. The
return to investment in the young is high; the return to investments in the old and less able is quite low. A
socially optimal investment strategy would equate returns across all investment levels. A central empirical
conclusion of their analysis is that at current investment levels, eciency in public spending would be en-
hanced if human capital investment were directed more toward the young and away from older, less-skilled,
and illiterate persons for whom human capital is a poor investment.
102.1 Multiple Skills, Plasticity, Self-Productivity and Dynamic Complemen-
tarity
In the rest of this section we examine in more detail three important features of the technology of skill
formation: 1) multiple skills; 2) plasticity; 3) self-productivity and dynamic complementarity. By multi-
ple skills we mean that there exists a multiplicity of skills which are important for an individual’s success
in life. By plasticity, we mean that the malleability an individual’s IQ and behavior traits changes (de-
creases) as people age. By self-productivity and dynamic complementarity we mean that skill begets skill.
Late investments are complements with early investments in the production of human capital. Without
early investments late investments are unproductive. Conversely, complementarity also implies that early
i n v e s t m e n t st h a ta r en o tf o l l o w e du pb yl a t e ri n v e s t m e n t sm a yn o tb ep r o d u c t i v ee i t h e r .
The analysis in Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and in this paper challenges the conventional point of view
that equates skill with intelligence. It draws on a body of research that demonstrates the importance of both
cognitive and noncognitive skills in determining socioeconomic success. Heckman, Hsee and Rubinstein
(2001) and Heckman and Rubinstein (2002) provide evidence of the importance of noncognitive skills
from an analysis of the GED program. GED recipients are high school dropouts who get a high school
certiﬁcation through the GED. In terms of cognitive ability, they are as smart as regular high school
graduates. This is shown in ﬁgure 3, that plots AFQT distributions for high school graduates and GED
recipients for digerent demographic groups in the NLSY. However, table 1 presents the coecients of a
log wage regression on GED recipiency and high school graduation and shows that GED recipients have
much lower wages than high school graduates. Furthermore, they have lower wages than regular high
school dropouts with the same level of cognitive ability. This means they lack some other skill, which
we interpret as a non-cognitive skill. Table 2 shows that GED recipients are also more likely to exhibit
disruptive behavior in school and work, and higher turnover rates on the job, than either high school
11graduates or high school dropouts. They lack skills such as motivation and discipline. These skills are
important in the labor market. Gaps in non-cognitive measures (such as anti-social behavior) by family
income appear very early in the life-cycle, as documented in ﬁgure 4 and in the work of Carneiro and
Heckman (2003).
Current educational policy and economic analysis focuses on tested academic achievement as the major
output of schools. Proposed systems for evaluating school performance are often premised on this idea.
Economic models of signaling and screening assume that predetermined cognitive ability is an important
determinant, if not the most important determinant, of academic and economic success. Recent evidence
challenges this view. No doubt, cognitive ability is an important factor in schooling and labor market
outcomes. At the same time, noncognitive abilities, although harder to measure, also play an important
role.
Recent studies in child development (e.g. Shonkog and Phillips 2000) emphasize that digerent stages
of the life cycle are critical to the formation of digerent types of abilities. When the opportunities for
formation of these abilities are missed, remediation is costly, and full remediation is often prohibitively
costly. These ﬁndings highlight the need to take a comprehensive view of skill formation over the life cycle
that is grounded in the best science and economics so that egective policies for increasing the low level of
skills in the workforce can be devised.
Both cognitive and noncognitive skills are agected by families and schools, but they diger in their
malleability over the life cycle, with noncognitive skills being more malleable than cognitive skills at
later ages. This ﬁnding is supported by studies of early childhood interventions that primarily improve
noncognitive skills, with substantial egects on schooling and labor market outcomes, but only weakly agect
cognitive ability. Table 3 shows that the well known early childhood programs have short lasting egects on
IQ but long lasting egects on achievement and behavioral outcomes of disadvantaged children. Mentoring
programs in the early teenage years can also agect these skills (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). Current
12analyses of skill formation focus too much on cognitive ability and too little on noncognitive ability in
evaluating human capital interventions, and in formalizing the skill formation process.
Digerences in levels of cognitive and noncognitive skills by family income and family background emerge
early and persist. If anything, schooling widens these early digerences. The work of Carneiro, Heckman
and Masterov (2003) on sources of racial skill digerential is illustrative of this claim. As shown in ﬁgure
5, test score gaps across race groups emerge very early (the graph displays the density of math scores at
age 5 for white males in digerent race groups, using the Children of NLSY). Figure 6 plots the egect of
schooling on test scores for digerent demographic groups in the NLSY. Test scores grow at a much slower
rate for blacks than for whites as children from both race groups progress through school.
The idea of self-productivity of human capital investments is rather old in economics and is developed
in the work of Ben-Porath (1967) who speciﬁes a production function where the stock human capital
increases the productivity of additional investments in human capital: human capital is a crucial input
in the production of more human capital. Becker and Tomes (1986) specify a production function where
innate ability increases the productivity of parental investments in the child’s human capital. The stock
of ability and human capital, and further investments in human capital are complementary inputs in
the production of skill. Complementarity also means that the costs of remediating the neglect of early
investments in human capital can be very high, if remediation investments have no solid (human capital)
base to build on. It also means that if early investments are not followed up by later investments then
their egect on the amount of skill accumulated by early adulthood may be small.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) summarize a body of evidence that suggests that complementarity is
empirically important. Table 4, from their paper, shows that white males in the High School and Beyond
with higher levels of cognitive ability have higher returns to college than individuals with lower levels of
cognitive ability.2 Those who know more to start with beneﬁt more from the college experience. This
2These estimates correct for the endogeneity of schooling and account for heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, both
13ﬁnding is replicated in other datasets. Table 5 shows that individuals with higher ability and education
are more likely to participate in company training than those with lower ability and education levels.
Individuals with higher levels of human capital receive higher investments through company training than
those with low levels of human capital. This is a common ﬁnding in the job training literature. A ﬁnal
example comes from the work of Currie and Thomas (1995) who study the Head-Start program and
conclude that the overall egects of this program on test scores are lower for black than for white children,
as seen in table 6 (the relevant parameter is the coecient on Head Start participation from the set of
columns that include mother ﬁxed egects, in panel A). In fact, the panel B of table 7 shows that the egect
of the program on test scores at the age the program ends is about the same for blacks and whites (the
direct egect of Head Start). There is no digerence on the ege c to fH e a dS t a r tp a r t i c i p a t i o no nP P V T
scores between blacks and whites at the age they leave the program (see the third column of the ﬁrst line
of panel B of this table). However the fade out egects after exit from Head Start are much larger for black
children. That is why a few years after these children have left the program we still see some impact on
test scores for whites but no impact of Head Start on test scores for blacks (as shown in table 6). These
fade out egects are estimated from the interaction of Head Start participation with age, and presented in
the second line of panel B of this table. In another paper, Currie and Thomas (2000) suggest that these
digerential fade out ege c t sm a yb ed u et ot h ef a c tt h a tb l a c kH e a dS t a r tc h i l d r e ng oo nt oa t t e n dm u c h
lower quality schools than white Head Start children. Head Start investments are followed up by very
poor schooling for black children and therefore it is not surprising that the ﬁnal egect of Head Start on
test scores of blacks is small.3 The productivity of early investments that are not followed up by later
investments can be very small. There is another aspect to complementarity that should be emphasized:
in terms of observable and unobservable variables.
3In other analysis of the Head Start data, Currie, Garces and Thomas (2003) show that Head Start has important eects
on high school graduation, wages and criminal behavior of adults. The eect on criminal behavior is very strong for blacks.
Although the program had a small eect on black test scores it had a large eect on black adult outcomes through its eect
on behavioral skills.
14early deﬁcits are hard to remediate with later investments, and the cost of remediation can be prohibitively
high because the productivity of late investments is very small in the absence of early investments. The
whole literature on public job training shows that it is hard to remediate the neglect of skill investment in
childhood and adolescence (see e.g. Lalonde, 1995, Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 1999, and Carneiro and
Heckman, 2003).
The ideas put forth so far can be formalized in a simple two period CES production function (easily










where H is the ﬁnal human capital of the child, A is ability, h is the human capital of parents, K0 and
K1 are early and late investments. Later we can allow H, K0 and K1 to be vectors of skills and vectors of
investments and therefore have multiple skills. The Ben-Porath (1967) technology is a special case of the
o n ew eh a v eh e r e .0 and 1are the plasticity parameters. If 1 is smaller than 0 then plasticity is smaller
at later ages than at early ages. The term 1
13 is the elasticity of substitution. When  is zero we have
a Cobb-Douglas technology. As  approaches -4 the technology gets closer and closer to the Leontieg
function. In the appendix we embed this technology in a dynastic model of human capital investment and
simulate the model. Figure 7 (which comes from the simulation of this model) illustrates how the costs
of late remediation of poor early investments change when the elasticity of substitution changes. When
complementarity increases, remediation costs increase as well.
We use this technology in a parental investment model where we allow investment to take place in
multiple periods. This is a simple but important extension of the traditional model of Becker and Tomes
(1979, 1986). In the appendix we present an overlapping generations model with altruism, with human
15capital investment, uncertainty and credit constraints. In this model parents are altruistic and can invest
in children over two (or more) periods: early childhood and adolescence. Parental human capital (and
family and neighborhood environments) is an input into the production of the child’s human capital, as
are the child’s innate ability and the resources invested in the child in both periods. Early investments
may be limited by several reasons, such as low parental human capital, or low availability of funds for
early investments. Scarcity of funds at early ages can be compensated if parents face rising income and
can postpone their consumption until the end of the early childhood of their child (substitute present and
future consumption).4 Low parental human capital cannot be easily substituted at early ages. A family
can be credit constrained in both investment periods, or in only one of them. This model operationalizes
the idea of short run and long run credit constraints of Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001) and Carneiro
and Heckman (2002). The government can intervene to remedy poor investments and poor environments
in disadvantaged families. Interventions can come in early childhood and in late adolescence. Remediation
of poor early investments in these families is very costly but my be granted on the grounds of equity.
Interventions in early childhood may be both ecient and equitable. The model presented in the appendix
is very incomplete but is illustrative of our current work (Carneiro, Cunha and Heckman, 2003).5
4In this model each parent only has one child, although this assumption can be relaxed.
5Consider the case in which parents can insure perfectly against idiosyncratic innovations in income, but cannot buy
ﬁnancial claims contingent on realizations of the ability shock, which follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process. Given the child’s
ability a, the parental human capital h and the value of ﬁnancial claims the parent receives as bequest b, the parent decides
how much early-investment x to perform on the child, how much to consume and how much to buy in securities s(%). Notice
that s(%) pays one unit of consumption good if the innovation in income is % and zero otherwise. Then, given the realization
of the innovation in income %, the ﬁnancial claims s(%), the parental human capital h, the early investment x,a n dt h e
child’s ability a, the parent decides how much late-investment to perform on the child. In this simple version, we assume
that the parent can either send the child to college or not. Let z = 1 if the child is sent to college, and z =0o t h e r w i s e .
This simple model replicates closely some empirical regularities consistent with the literature summarized above. First, the
lifetime returns to late-investment (i.e. z = 1) are about 22% for those who actually are invested on in the late stage. The
ﬁgure for those who do not get invested on is only around 10% as shown in table 1 in the appendix. Table 2 in the appendix
breaks up the above calculation per ability group. We denote group 1 the lowest ability group, and group 15 the highest
ability group. Notice that the returns to investment in the late stage are roughly increasing in ability and around the range
of 19%-27%, while those who do not get any investment face returns in the range of 5%-14%. Table 3 in the appendix shows
the intergenerational mobility table. The element aij of this table reports the probability that a child is in the j-th decile of
the present value of earnings distribution given that the parent is in the i-th decile. The table shows very little persistence,
which is a result of the complete set of insurance contracts against the innovations in income.
163 Conclusion
This paper presents formal models of child development that capture the essence of recent ﬁndings from the
empirical literature on child development. The goal is to provide theoretical frameworks for interpreting
the evidence from a vast empirical literature, for guiding the next generation of empirical studies and for
formulating policy. We start from the premise that skill formation is a life-cycle process. It starts in the
womb and goes on throughout most of the adult life. Families and ﬁrms have a role in this process that
is at least as important as the role of schools. There are multiple skills and multiple abilities that are
important for adult success. Abilities are both inherited and created, and the traditional debate of nature
versus nurture is outdated and scientiﬁcally obsolete. The technology of skill formation has two additional
important characteristics. The ﬁrst one is that IQ and behavior are more plastic at early ages than at
later ages. Furthermore, behavior is much more malleable than IQ as individuals age. The second is that
human capital investments are complementary over time. Early investments increase the productivity of
later investments. Early investments are not productive if they are not followed up by later investments.
The returns to investing early in the life cycle are high. Remediation of inadequate early investments is
dicult and very costly.
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*The income measure we use is average family income between the ages of 6 and 10. Income quartiles are
then computed from this measure of income
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Figure 3
Children of NLSYGED Recipients and High School Graduates with Twelve Years of Schooling
Fi gur e  4
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Source: Heckman, Hsee and Rubinstein (2001)Figure 5 - Effect of Schooling on AFQT for Different Demographic Groups, NLSY79
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This graph shows the effect of schooling at test date on AFQT scores for different demographic groups in the NLSY. It plots the coefficients on schooling at test date of a regression of 
AFQT scores on schooling at test date and complete schooling (see Hansen, Heckman and Mullen). The baseline category is 8 years of schooling. For example, white males with 9 
years of schooling at test date score 12 points higher on the AFQT than white males with 8 years of schooling. White males with 15 years of schooling score 25 points higher on the 
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This test measures the child’s attainment in mathematics as taught in mainstream education. It consists of 84
multipleîchoice questions of increasing difficulty, beginning with recognizing numerals and progressing to
geometry and trigonometry. The percentile score was calculated separately for each sex at each age.
CNLSY 79 Males
Figure 6
Density of Percentile PIAT Math Scores at Ages 5î6Figure 7: Percentage Increase in Investment in Period 1 Relative to Uncon-
strained Amount of Investment in Period 1 Needed to Remedy Low Investment
at Period 0












Let N1 () and N
1 ()denote the optimal and remediation in-
v e s t m e n t si np e r i o d1 .I nt h i sﬁgure we plot
N
1()N1()
N1() = For each
value of the elasticity of substitution , we compute the steady state
stock of human capital K()= We take this as the target. We then
set the parental human capital Ks ()2 =5% below K().W e t h e n
compute N0> the investment in period 0, by approximating the pol-
icy function j(Ks()) linearly around the steady state. We then use
the production function to determine the remediation investment in
p e r i o d1t h a ti sn e e d e dt oo b t a i nK() given initial conditions Ks()
and N0 = j(Ks())=Variable (i) (ii) (iii)
High school dropout -0.273 -0.193 -0.022
(0.024) (0.026) (0.033)
GED degree -0.181 -0.187 -0.107
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Armed Forces Qualifying Test*  0.106 0.074
(0.013) (0.014)




GED-HSD 0.092 0.006 -0.085
F-test: probability>F: GED=HSD {0.029} {0.876} {0.039}
Observations 12824 12824 12824
Individuals 1288 1288 1288
R-square 0.140 0.161 0.183
Notes:
The table reports results for a sub-sample of white males aged 20-36 from the NLSY
The sub-sample excludes GED recipients who got their degree at age 16 or 17.
All specifications include control for: (1) experience, (2) county level unemployment rate, 
(3) region of residence, (4) and cohort of birth.
* Age-adjusted to 0 mean in the population sample
High school dropouts are those who dropped out of school and did not get a GED diploma
GED recipients are those who dropped out of school and get a GED diploma.
High school graduates who graduated high school and did not take further schooling.
( ) Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 1:
OLS 
High School Dropouts, GED Recipients and High School Graduates
How Do Labor Markets Treat the GED Recipients? 
A First Glance at the DataHS GED HS HS GED HS
Dr opout s Reci pi ent s Gr aduat es Dr opout s Reci pi ent s Gr aduat es
I ndex  of   i l l i ci t   act i vi t y  ( I LA)   ~0 . 11 0. 18* 0. 05 - 0. 01 0. 05* - 0. 04
(0.012) (0.017) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.004)
Par t i cul ar  quest i ons:
Skipped school in last year 0.13 0. 10 0.00 0.00 0. 13* 0.00
(0.023) (0.030) (0.011) (0.030) (0.035) (0.011)
Shoplifted last year 0.05 0. 15* 0.01 0.00 0. 17* -0.03
(0.027) (0.039) (0.014) (0.038) (0.045) (0.014)
Smoked pot last year 0.14 0. 26* 0.03 0.05 0. 27* 0.03
(0.029) (0.037) (0.016) (0.044) (0.043) (0.017)
Used drugs last year 0.10 0. 26* 0.03 0.09 0. 24* 0.03
(0.026) (0.039) (0.013) (0.038) (0.045) (0.013)
Ever stopped by police 0.16 0. 25* 0.09 -0.03 0. 00 -0.09
(0.028) (0.039) (0.014) (0.030) (0.035) (0.009)
~ ILA is the average score on the 22 yes/no questions regarding illicit and delinquent behavior.
 Responses are age-adjusted and standardized to 0 mean in the population sample
^ The male sample excludes males reporting being in prison, for any period of time, in the years 1979-1994
^^ The female sample excludes teenage mothers
HSD = high school dropouts who do not get a GED degree
GED = GED recipients
HSG = high school graduates who do not take further schooling (12 years of schooling)
* Significantly different from HSD figures at the 5 percent level
Tabl e  2:
Notes: The table shows means (with standard errors in parenthesis) from the NLSY
I l l i ci t   and  Del i nquent   Act i vi t y  by  Wh i t es,
Shown  Separ at el y  f or   Hi gh  School   Dr opout s,   GED  Reci pi ent s,   and  Hi gh  School   Gr aduat es.
Fem al es^^ Ma l es^Wdeoh 3
Rxwfrphv ri Hduo| Lqwhuyhqwlrq Surjudpv
Surjudp +\hduv ri Rshudwlrq, Rxwfrph Iroorzhg Xs Djh ri Frqwuro Fkdqjh lq
wr Djh Wuhdwphqw Jurxs Wuhdwhg
HhfwW Jurxs
Frjqlwlyh
Phdvxuhv Hduo| Wudlqlqj Surmhfw +4<95 0 4<98, LT 49 0 53 9 ;51; .4515
Shuu| Suhvfkrro Surmhfw +4<95 0 4<9:, LT 5: : ;:14 .713
Krxvwrq SFGF +4<:3 0 4<;3, LT ; 0 44 5 <31; .;13
V|udfxvh IGUS +4<9< 0 4<:3, LT 48 6 <319 .4<1:
Fdurolqd Dehfhgduldq +4<:5 0 4<;8, LT 54 45 ;;17 .816
Surmhfw FDUH +4<:; 0 4<;7, LT 718 6 <519 .4419
LKGS +4<;8 0 4<;; , LT +KOEZ vdpsoh, ; ; <514 .717
Hgxfdwlrqdo
Rxwfrphv Hduo| Wudlqlqj Surmhfw Vshfldo Hgxfdwlrq 49 0 53 4; 5<( 059(
Shuu| Suhvfkrro Surmhfw Vshfldo Hgxfdwlrq 5: 4< 5;( 045(
Kljk Vfkrro Judgxdwlrq 5: 78( .54(
Fklfdjr FSF +4<9: 0 suhvhqw, Vshfldo Hgxfdwlrq 53 4; 58( 043(
Judgh Uhwhqwlrq 48 6;( 048(
Kljk Vfkrro Judgxdwlrq 53 6<( .44(
Fdurolqd Dehfhgduldq Froohjh Hquroophqw 54 54 47( .55(
Hfrqrplf
Rxwfrphv Shuu| Suhvfkrro Surmhfw Duuhvw Udwh 5: 5: 9<( 045(
Hpsor|phqw Udwh 5: 65( .4;(
Prqwko| Hduqlqjv 5: ':99 . '786
Zhoiduh Xvh 5: 65( 04:(
Fklfdjr FSF +suhvfkrro yv1 qr suhvfkrro, Mxyhqloh Duuhvwv 53 4; 58( 0;(
V|udfxvh IGUS Suredwlrq Uhihuudo 48 48 55( 049(
Hoplud SHLS +4<:; 0 4<;5, Duuhvwv +KU vdpsoh, 48 48 3186 0135<
Qrwhv= KOEZ @ khdylhu/ orz eluwk zhljkw vdpsoh> KU @ kljk ulvn1 WDjh zkhq wuhdwphqw hhfw zdv odvw vwdwlvwlfdoo| vljqlfdqw1
Frjqlwlyh phdvxuhv lqfoxgh Vwdqirug0Elqhw dqg Zhvkohu Lqwhooljhqfh Vfdohv/ Fdoliruqld Dfklhyhphqw Whvwv/ dqg rwkhu LT
dqg dfklhyhphqw whvwv phdvxulqj frjqlwlyh delolw|1 Doo uhvxowv vljqlfdqw dw 138 ohyho ru kljkhu1
Vrxufh= Nduro| +5334, Iru d glvfxvvlrq ri wkh vshflfw u h d w p h q w vr huhg xqghu hdfk surjudp/ vhh Khfnpdq +5333, dqg Nduro| +5334,1Table 4
Return to one year of college for individuals
at dierent percentiles of the math test score distribution
White males from High School and Beyond
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Average return in the population 0.1121 0.1374 0.1606 0.1831 0.2101
(0.0400) (0.0328) (0.0357) (0.0458) (0.0622)
Return for those who attend college 0.1640 0.1893 0.2125 0.2350 0.2621
(0.0503) (0.0582) (0.0676) (0.0801) (0.0962)
Return for those who do not attend college 0.0702 0.0954 0.1187 0.1411 0.1682
(0.0536) (0.0385) (0.0298) (0.0305) (0.0425)
Return for those at the margin 0.1203 0.1456 0.1689 0.1913 0.2184
(0.0364) (0.0300) (0.0345) (0.0453) (0.0631)
Wages are measured in 1991 by dividing annual earnings by hours worked per week
multiplied by 52. The math test score is and average of two 10th grade math test scores.
There are no dropouts in the sample and the schooling variable is binary (high school - college).
The gross returns to college are divided by 3.5 (average dierence in years of schooling
between high school graduates that go to college and high school graduates that do not in a
sample of white males in the NLSY). To construct the numbers in the table we proceed in two
steps. First we compute the marginal treatment eect using the method of local instrumental
variables as in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001). The parameters in the table are
dierent weighted averages of the marginal treatment eect. Therefore, in the second step
we compute the appropriate weight for each parameter and use it to construct a weighted
average of the marginal treatment eect (see also Carneiro, 2002). Individuals at the margin
are indierent between attending college or not.on participation in  company training
Average marginal eect
Variables White males Black males Hispanic males
( 1 )( 2 )( 1 )( 2 )( 1 ) ( 2 )
Age-adjusted AFQT 0.0149 - 0.0182 - 0.0066 -
(0=0024) - (0=0033) - (0=0037) -
Family income in 1979 -0.0021 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0019 0.0011 0.0015
(in $10,000) (0=0012) (0=0011) (0=0024) (0=0023) (0=0024) (0=0023)
Grade completed 0.0382 - 0.0060 - 0.0036 -
(0=001) - (0=0014) - (0=0014) -
Father’s education -0.0014 0.0007 0.0003 0.0010 0.0002 0.0008
(0=0006) (0=0005) (0=0008) (0=0008) (0=0007) (0=0007)
White females Black females Hispanic females
( 1 )( 2 )( 1 )( 2 )( 1 ) ( 2 )
Age-adjusted AFQT 0.0076 - 0.0169 - 0.0159 -
(0=0025) - (0=0038) - (0=0045) -
Family income in 1979 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0065 -0.0043
(in $10,000) (0=0011) (0=0011) (0=0024) (0=0023) (0=0031) (0=0029)
Grade completed 0.0027 - 0.0014 - 0.0013 -
(0=0010) - (0=0016) - (0=0016) -
Father’s education 0.0001 0.0009 0.0015 0.0021 -0.00001 0.0007
(0=0006) (0=0006) (0=0008) (0=0008) (0=0009) (0=0008)
Note: The panel data set was constructed using NLSY79 data from 1979-1994. Data on training in 1987 is
combined with 1988 in the original data set. Company training consists of formal training conducted by
employer, and military training excluding basic training.
Speciﬁcation (1) includes a constant, age, father’s education, mother’s education, number of siblings,
southern residence at age 14 dummy, urban residence at age 14 dummy, and year dummies.
Speciﬁcation (2) drops age-adjusted AFQT and grade completed. Average marginal eect is
estimated using average derivatives from a probit regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 5
Average marginal effect of AFQT, family income, grade completed and father's education Table 6Table 71 Appendix - Embedding the Skill Technology in a Dy-
nastic Model with Human Capital Investments with
Uncertainty and Credit Constraints
1.1 Generational Structure
The environment is an economy with an inﬁnite number of periods, each one denoted t 5
{0,1,2,...}. In each period there are generations that overlap. Each generation consists of a
continuum of agents that live for four periods. We denote these periods by child, adolescent,
young, old. At the end of each period t the old adults die and they are replaced by the children
spawned by the young adults. These children will then become adolescents at period t+1, young
adults at period t+2, and old adults at period t+3. Life goes on in the future in similar fashion.
1.2 Ability and Human Capital
Each agent is born with innate ability a. We assume that child’s ability a follows a ﬁrst-order
Markov process of the form:
a = µa31 + D
with µ 5 (0,1) and D  N (0,j2
D). We denote by A the invariant distribution of ability and by A
its support. The distribution function A is a primitive of the model. The invariance assumption
generates the implication that the cross-sectional distribution of ability will be given by At = A
for all t.The ability of a child born in period t is perfectly known.
Adults diger in terms of their human capital h. Parents can inﬂuence the productivity of
their ogspring by investing in the education of their kid during childhood and adolescent periods.
Consider a period-t parent. That means that the parent was born at period t-2 and his kid was
born in the current period t. Let h denote the human capital of the parent. Assume that the
parent invests resources x,z during the childhood and adolescent years of his ogspring. The kid
will grow up and become an adult person with human capital h0 as described by:
h
0 = H (a,h,x,z)( 1 )
The function H is taken to be a primitive of the model.
Assumption A1 The production function of human capital has the following properties:
H is strictly increasing in all its arguments.
H is a strictly concave function in h.





















 , if z>0
for 0 < b < 1,  1,0 < 4 < 1.
1.3 The Problem of the Agent
Adults are subject to income innovations when young and old. Let 0,# denote the shocks in
income of the young and the old. We assume that the shocks are independently and identically
distributed. We denote by G0,G # the distributions of 0,#, respectively.
The Budget Constraint We start by assuming that the agents can buy full insurance
against the idiosyncratic shocks in income. However, grandparents cannot buy insurance against
shocks in the ability of the grandchild. Let s(#) denote the amount of securities bought by the
young parent that pays one unit of consumption good if the idiosyncratic shock in the income of
the agent when old parent is # and zero otherwise. Let qs (#) denote the price of such security.
Accordingly, let b(0) denote the amount of securities that the old parent leaves as bequest to
his kid and that pays one unit of consumption good if the child’s income idiosyncratic shock
when young parent is 0 and zero otherwise. We denote by qb(0) the price of such claim. Let
c
t32
t ,h t32 denote the consumption and human capital stock of the period-t young parent. Let xt
t
denote the investment in the human capital of period-t c h i l dm a d eb yh i sp a r e n t . W ea s s u m e
that xt
t can take on a discrete number of values that are in the set X = {x1,x 2,...,x n} with
x1 <x 2 <. . .<x n. Let w d e n o t et h ew a g er a t e .S i n c ew ef o c u so ns t e a d ys t a t e s ,w ed on o ti n d e x







s(#)qs (#)d# = wh
t32 + 0t + bt (0t)
To describe the old parent’s budget constraint, we note that there are ﬁxed costs of investing
in the human capital of the kid when he is adolescent. We assume that this ﬁxed cost is constant
over time. Let c
t32
t+1 be the consumption of the period-(t + 1) old parent (who is the period-t young
parent). Let p denote the ﬁxed cost of investment in the human capital of the period-(t +1 )
adolescent (again, the period-t child). Let zt
t+1 denote the amount invested in the period-(t +1 )
adolescent. We assume that zt
t+1 c a nt a k eo nv a l u e si nt h es e tZ = {0,z 1,z 2,...,z m} with











b(0)qb (0)d0 = wh







b(0)qb (0)d0 = wh
t32 + #t + st+1 (#t), if z
t
t+1 =0


























































































b(0)qb (0)d0 = wh







b(0)qb (0)d0 = wh




















There are two inputs in the production function of goods: physical capital and labor, which
measured in eciency units. Let k,l denote the aggregate quantities of physical capital and
labor, respectively. Let y denote the aggregate output. The production technology is represented
by the production function f:
y = F (k,l)
3Assumption A2 The production function of aggregate output has the following properties:
F is twice-continuously digerentiable.
F is strictly increasing in all its arguments.
F satisﬁes the Inada Conditions.
F presents constant returns to scale.
F is a strictly concave function.
1.5 Educational Sector
There is an educational sector that produces goods for investment in human capital. This sector
does not use physical capital as input, only labor. The production technology is represented by
the production function J:
e = J (u)
Assumption A3 The production function of education goods has the following properties:
J is linear.
1.6 Notation
In what follows, let a 5 A denote the ability of a child born in period t1 from a parental with




t (a,h) denote the early and late investments received
by such a child born in period t1. The distribution of eciency units h0 of period t+1 young




0)=P r{(a,h) 5 A×H/H[a,h,xt31 (a,h),z t (a,h)]  h
0}
The set of period t + 1 young adults become skilled is given by:
St+1 = {(a,h) 5 A×H/z t (a,h) > 0}
Let xt denote the period-t aggregate level of early investment in human capital of the children
born in period t. Accordingly, Gh












Let zt denote the period-t aggregate level of early investment in human capital of the children
born in period t1. Accordingly, Gh













The aggregate output of the goods sector in period t, yt, may be used as aggregate consumption of
the young parents, c
t32
t , aggregate consumption of the old parents, c
t33











t+1 denote the period-t aggregate old parents’ aggregate bequest and young parents’













t denote the period-t aggregate stock of eciency units of old and young parents,
























The aggregate stock of physical capital may be allocated to goods or educational sectors:
lt + ut = ht
The equilibrium in the educational sector requires that:
xt + zt = et
1.8 Deﬁnition of Stationary General Equilibrium with Insurable In-
come Shocks
The individual state variable for the young parents are the income shock 0t, the realization of
the ability shock of the child at, the bequest they inherit from their parents conditioned on the
realization of income shock 0t,b t
0, the stock of human capital they have ht. The control variables
are the consumption when young c
t32
t , the amount of Arrow-Debreu securities that they buy
st
#, and the amount of early investment they do on the human capital of the kid xt
t. When an
old parent (at period t + 1), the individual state variables are the income shock when #t+1,t h e
amount of ﬁnancial claims they posess given the realization of #t+1, st
#, their stock of human
5capital ht, the ability of the child at, the amount of early investment xt
t. The control variables
are consumption when old c
t32
t+1, amount of Arrow-Debreus securities they leave as bequest bt+1
0 and
t h el a t ei n v e s t m e n tzt
t+1. For both young and old parentes, the aggregate state variables are the
distribution of human capital, bequest and savings Gh
t,G b
t, and Gs
t, respectively. In what follows,






















set of state variables for the young and old parents, respectively.
We are ready to deﬁne the concept of equilibrium.






























constitute a stationary general equilibrium
with insurable income shocks if
(1)Given prices, transition rules for stocks of physical and human capital, transition rules for
income shocks 0 and #, then the decision rules solve the maximization problem of the agent.















max{F (k,l)  (r + B)k  wl}
max{J (u)  wu}
(3) The aggregate factors of production are generated by the aggregation of the decision rules
of the individuals.
(4) The allocation is feasible







(6) The distribution of asset holdings Gk,G s and human capital Gh are generated by the







1.9 Characterization of the Stationary General Equilibrium with In-
surable Income Shocks
1.9.1 The First-Order Conditions




of the young parent in period



















We start by deriving the steady-state Euler equations. To carry out this task, we use the




















Ycy = q (1 + r)
Yu
Yco (5)




























1.9.2 The Deterministic Steady State:
Consider the version without uncertainty. In this case, equation (7) becomes:
Yu
Yco = qw(1 + r)
Yu
Ycy








In this case, the steady state interest rate is the same as in the steady state of the neoclassical
growth model.
7Computation Given the steady state interest rate r, the capital-labor ratio is determined,
because the production function satisﬁes constant-returns to scale. Given the capital-labor ratio,
we can determine the steady state wage rate w. Given prices, we can then solve the problem of
the agents by discretizing the state space and obtain the policy functions using the method of
Bellman Iteration. We then simulate the series by sampling shocks on ability and income and
applying the policy functions. We discard the ﬁrst 100000 samples to allow the Markov Chain
to converge. We use Monte-Carlo integration to compute the expectations that are required to
check the market clearing conditions.
We approximate the Markov process for ability according to the procedure developed in
Tauchen(1986). We use a 15-point grid to approximate the process:
at+1 =0 .5at + Dt+1
Dt+1  N (0,0.5)
we calculate the invariant distribution to sample agents for the simulated series. Figure 1 shows
the histogram associated with the invariant distribution of ability.
The production function for human capital is:
h
0 =





 , if z>0
and we use a =0 .5, h =0 .1,4 =0 .6,x =0 .6,z =0 .4, = 2.
We take X = {0.1,0.2,0.3} and Z = {0,1}. Again, the child is labeled skilled if z =1 , and
unskilled otherwise. Figure 2 shows the histogram associated with the steady state distribution
of human capital. We note that the distribution of human capital is skewed even though the
distribution of ability is symmetric around zero.




with k =0 .36. In ﬁgure 3 we plot the histogram associated with the stationary distribution of
bequests. We note that many parents leave negative bequests to their children. These children
tend to receive a lot of investment in human capital, and the parents borrow against the income
of the children to ﬁnance such investments. It is also interesting to note that the distribution is
also skewed and not centered around zero. A few parents leave relatively large bequests to their
children in equilibrium. In ﬁgure 4, we plot the histogram of savings. Saving decisions are made
by the young parents. First, the distribution of savings is lightly skewed, with positive, close to
zero, mean.
Table 1 shows the intergenerational mobility matrix. The element mij of this matrix can be
read as the probability that a child will be in the j-th decile of the present value of earnings
distribution given that his parent is in the i-th decile. This table shows that there is some
persistence that is partly caused by genetics of ability and partly caused by the egect of parental
human capital in the production function of skills.
8Table 2 shows the average treatment egect, the treatment on the treated and the treatment
on the untreated estimators of the returns to skills. First, note from collumn 2 from table 2 that
the treatment on the treated is positive and about 24% over the lifetime, while the treatment on
the untreated is negative and also around -24%. The average treatment egect is the weighted
mean of these two estimators. The average treatment egect is negative because the majority of
the kids become unskilled (about 58%).
Table 3 shows the treatment on the treated and the treatment on the untreated estimators
by ability group. The TT estimator is fairly increasing with ability, and always above 19%. The
TU estimator is also increasing with ability, but it is always negative. The variance within each
ability group is caused by the variation in parental human capital.
1.10 Uninsurable Income Shocks and Liquidity Constraints
We now change the budget constraint of the agent in the following manners. First, the agents
cannot buy insurance against the idiosyncratic shock in income that they face. Second, the
agents face liquidity constraints: they cannot leave negative bequests to the kids, and cannot
carry on negative assets from young adulthood to old age. The problem of the parent becomes:
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10Figure 1: The Histogram of Ability
Figure 1 displays the histogram associated with the Invariant Distribution of Ability. We
use Tauchen (1986) procedure to approximate such distribution by a 15-point discrete
Markov Process. We assume that ability follows the process:
dw+1 = dw + w+1





= Based on these facts, the invariant distribution









1Figure 2: The Histogram of Human Capital
Figure 2 is the histogram of the Steady State Distribution of Human Capital in the model
with full insurance against idiosyncratic innovations in income that are uncorrelated with
human capital. We remind the reader that the law of motion of human capital is given
by the production function
k0 = K (d>k>{>})
where k0 denotes the human capital of the child when an adult, d denotes the child’s
innate ability, k is the parental human capital, { is the early investment in human
capital and } is the investment in human capital that takes place in adolescent years. To
obtain this histogram, we proceed in the following manner. First, we solve the model as
described in the text by discretizing the state space and applying the Bellman Iteration
principle. This process allows us to obtain the decision rules of savings, bequest and
investment in human capital as functions of the child’s ability, parental human capital
and parental wealth. We then simulate a series of data by drawing ability from its
stationary distribution. We discard the ﬁrst 100,000 realizations of such series to allow
the Markov chain to converge. Then, we save the next 100,000 realizations from which
we compute the histogram above.
2Figure 3: The Histogram of Present Value of Earnings
Figure 3 plots the the histogram of the Steady State Distribution of Present Value of
Earnings (in hundred thousand dollars) in the model with full insurance against idio-
syncratic innovations in income that are uncorrelated with human capital. We remind
the reader of two points: ﬁrst, the agent supplies labor inelastically during young and
old adulthood (children never work), and second that there is no depreciation of human
capital k over the lifecycle of the agent. Thus, the present value of earnings | is given
by:




where z>u are the steady-state wage and interest rates. To obtain this histogram, we
proceed in the following manner. First, we solve the model as described in the text by
discretizing the state space and applying the Bellman Iteration principle. This process
allows us to obtain the decision rules of savings, bequest and investment in human capital
as functions of the child’s ability, parental human capital and parental wealth. We then
simulate a series of data by drawing ability from its stationary distribution. We discard
3the ﬁrst 100,000 realizations of such series to allow the Markov chain to converge. Then,
we save the next 100,000 realizations from which we compute the histogram above.






Average Returns 0.1714 0.221 0.0972
Standard Deviation 0.0774 0.0579 0.0278
Average Returns
Table
Table 1 presents the returns to becoming skilled as implied by the model with full
insurance against idiosyncratic innovations in income that are uncorrelated with human
capital. Collumn 1 presents the average returns for the population, collumn 2 presents
the implied returns for only those who become skilled and the last collumn shows the
returns for those who do not become skilled. Formally, let |v, |x denote the factual
lifetime present value of earnings if skilled and unskilled, respectively. Let  denote
the ﬁxed cost of becoming skilled, let { denote the early investment in human capital.
According to the model if the agent becomes skilled then } =1while if it is unskilled then
} =0 = F o re a c hp e r s o nw i t ha b i l i t yd> parental human capital k> and early investment
{ we observe whether } =1or } =0 = Let kv>k x denote the human capital of the skilled
and unskilled, respectively. Let ˜ kx>˜ kv denote the counterfactual human capital for the
skilled as unskilled, and unskilled as skilled, respectively. Then,
















that is ˜ |x> ˜ |v denote the counterfactual lifetime present value of earnings if skilled and
unskilled, respectively. The average return to becoming skilled for those who are skilled
is given by:
H (uhwxuqv | skilled)=H

|v  ˜ |x  
˜ |x + 
| skilled
¸
which is shown in collumn 2 shows. Collumn 3 shows:
H (uhwxuqv | unskilled)=H





5Let s denote the proportion of agents that become skilled. Collumn 1 shows:
H (uhwxuqv)=sH (uhwxuqv | skilled)+( 1 s)H (uhwxuqv | unskilled)



















Group 1 0.197752 0.001277 0.055550 0.000014
Group 2 0.159974 0.002802 0.065188 0.000222
Group 3 0.218582 0.001319 0.084675 0.000302
Group 4 0.178326 0.003059 0.068183 0.000125
Group 5 0.166669 0.003181 0.087984 0.000479
Group 6 0.248078 0.000088 0.078313 0.000256
Group 7 0.250214 0.000212 0.106608 0.000088
Group 8 0.186507 0.003670 0.107686 0.000306
Group 9 0.228918 0.003176 0.083991 0.000304
Group 10 0.260372 0.000444 0.078347 0.000069
Group 11 0.203515 0.004248 0.116352 0.000667
Group 12 0.274707 0.000096 0.114489 0.000722
Group 13 0.276833 0.000049 0.128190 0.000320
Group 14 0.271600 0.000638 0.137184 0.000067
Group 15 0.277610 0.000019 0.139753 0.000054
Average Returns by Ability Group
Table
Table 2 presents the returns to becoming skilled per ability group as implied by the
model with full insurance against idiosyncratic innovations in income that are uncor-
related with human capital. Collumn 1 presents the average returns for the group of
agents that are skilled in equilibrium, collumn 2 presents the variance of such returns.
Collumn 3 presents the implied returns for only those who are unskilled in equilibrium
and the last collumn shows the variance of such returns. Formally, let |v (d), |x (d)
denote the factual lifetime present value of earnings of a person with ability d if skilled
and unskilled, respectively. Let  denote the ﬁxed cost of becoming skilled, let { denote
the early investment in human capital. According to the model if the agent becomes
skilled then } =1while if it is unskilled then } =0 = For each person with ability d>
parental human capital k> and early investment { we observe whether } =1or } =0 =
Let kv (d)>k x (d) denote the human capital of the skilled and unskilled of a person with
ability d, respectively. Let ˜ kx (d)>˜ kv (d) denote the counterfactual human capital for


















that is ˜ |x (d)> ˜ |v (d) denote the counterfactual lifetime present value of earnings if skilled
and unskilled of a person with ability d, respectively. The average return to becoming
skilled for those who are skilled is given by:
H (uhwxuqv | d>skilled)=H





which is shown in collumn 1 shows. Collumn 3 shows:
H (uhwxuqv | d>unskilled)=H





8Figure  6 : The Average Returns to Skill Conditioned on Being Skilled





















Average Returns Conditioned on Being Skilled
Figure 6 presents the returns to becoming skilled conditioned on being skilled, per abil-
ity group, as implied by the model with full insurance against idiosyncratic innovations
in income that are uncorrelated with human capital. Collumn 1 presents the average
returns for the group of agents that are skilled in equilibrium, collumn 2 presents the
variance of such returns. Collumn 3 presents the implied returns for only those who
are unskilled in equilibrium and the last collumn shows the variance of such returns.
Formally, let |v (d), |x (d) denote the factual lifetime present value of earnings of a
person with ability d if skilled and unskilled, respectively. Let  denote the ﬁxed cost
of becoming skilled, let { denote the early investment in human capital. According to
the model if the agent becomes skilled then } =1while if it is unskilled then } =0 =
For each person with ability d> parental human capital k> and early investment { we
observe whether } =1or } =0 = Let kv (d)>k x (d) denote the human capital of the
skilled and unskilled of a person with ability d, respectively. Let ˜ kx (d)>˜ kv (d) denote
the counterfactual human capital for the skilled as unskilled, and unskilled as skilled of

















that is ˜ |x (d)> ˜ |v (d) denote the counterfactual lifetime present value of earnings if skilled
and unskilled of a person with ability d, respectively. The average return to becoming
skilled for those who are skilled is given by:
H (uhwxuqv | d>skilled)=H





which is shown in collumn 1 shows. Collumn 3 shows:
H (uhwxuqv | d>unskilled)=H





10Figure 7: The Returns to Skill Conditioned on Being Unskilled























Average Returns Conditioned on Being Unskilled
Figure 7 presents the returns to becoming skilled conditioned on being skilled, per abil-
ity group, as implied by the model with full insurance against idiosyncratic innovations
in income that are uncorrelated with human capital. Collumn 1 presents the average
returns for the group of agents that are skilled in equilibrium, collumn 2 presents the
variance of such returns. Collumn 3 presents the implied returns for only those who
are unskilled in equilibrium and the last collumn shows the variance of such returns.
Formally, let |v (d), |x (d) denote the factual lifetime present value of earnings of a
person with ability d if skilled and unskilled, respectively. Let  denote the ﬁxed cost
of becoming skilled, let { denote the early investment in human capital. According to
the model if the agent becomes skilled then } =1while if it is unskilled then } =0 =
For each person with ability d> parental human capital k> and early investment { we
observe whether } =1or } =0 = Let kv (d)>k x (d) denote the human capital of the
skilled and unskilled of a person with ability d, respectively. Let ˜ kx (d)>˜ kv (d) denote
the counterfactual human capital for the skilled as unskilled, and unskilled as skilled of

















that is ˜ |x (d)> ˜ |v (d) denote the counterfactual lifetime present value of earnings if skilled
and unskilled of a person with ability d, respectively. The average return to becoming
skilled for those who are skilled is given by:
H (uhwxuqv | d>skilled)=H





which is shown in collumn 1 shows. Collumn 3 shows:
H (uhwxuqv | d>unskilled)=H





12Figure  8: Table 3 - The Intergenerational Mobility Table
D e c i l e 123456789 1 0
1 0.1413 0.1375 0.1270 0.0969 0.1858 0.0893 0.0276 0.0422 0.1194 0.0331
2 0.2649 0.0989 0.0769 0.0084 0.0411 0.1824 0.1405 0.0003 0.1612 0.0254
3 0.2019 0.0841 0.1400 0.1060 0.0048 0.0851 0.2335 0.0103 0.1067 0.0277
4 0.0377 0.1117 0.0810 0.0674 0.1197 0.0278 0.1245 0.1743 0.1720 0.0839
5 0.0162 0.1084 0.1299 0.2124 0.1514 0.0123 0.0299 0.1493 0.1393 0.0509
6 0.0058 0.1437 0.0848 0.1617 0.1427 0.0104 0.0226 0.2034 0.1456 0.0792
7 0.0030 0.1511 0.0858 0.1710 0.1627 0.0078 0.0138 0.2117 0.1363 0.0569
8 0.0527 0.0717 0.1017 0.1344 0.1121 0.1322 0.0312 0.0719 0.1124 0.1797
9 0.2196 0.0080 0.0916 0.0479 0.0878 0.1630 0.1721 0.0426 0.0235 0.1439
10 0.0615 0.0786 0.0687 0.0565 0.0922 0.1669 0.1633 0.1146 0.0448 0.1530
Intergenerational Mobility Table in the Model with Full Insurance Against Idiosyncratic Shocks in Income 
Table
Table 3 displays the steady-state intergenerational mobility table implied by the model
with full insurance against idiosyncratic innovations in income that are uncorrelated
with human capital. The element dlm of the table is the probability that a child will
be in the j-th decile of the lifetime present value of earnings given that his parent is
in the i-th decile. For example, d11 =0 =1413 means that with probability 14.13%
ac h i l dw i t hap a r e n ti nt h eﬁrst decile of the lifetime present value of earnings will
also be in the ﬁrst-decile of lifetime present value of earnings, whereas with probability
3.31% it will be in the highest decile. To obtain this table we proceed as follows.
First, we solve the model as described in the text by discretizing the state space and
applying the Bellman Iteration principle. This process allows us to obtain the decision
rules of savings, bequest and investment in human capital as functions of the child’s
ability, parental human capital and parental wealth. We then simulate a series of data
by drawing ability from its Markov process (and not from the stationary distribution,
as parental ability matters to determine child’s ability). We discard the ﬁrst 100,000
realizations of such series to allow the Markov chain to converge. Then, we save the
next 100,000 realizations from which we compute the table above.
13